The Entity that Dare Not Speak Its Name: Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order by Roth, Brad
 
(91) 
THE ENTITY THAT DARE NOT SPEAK ITS NAME: 
UNRECOGNIZED TAIWAN AS A RIGHT-BEARER 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER* 
 
BRAD R. ROTH** 
 
James Crawford's magisterial 2006 second edition of The Creation of States in 
International Law, updating his 1979 text in light of the intervening period's vast 
accumulation of international practice, was much awaited in Taiwan, which has 
seen a major transformation in its external relations over the last quarter-
century.  Though Crawford asserts that the suppression by force of 23 million 
people cannot be consistent with the United )ations Charter, and that therefore 
to that extent there must be a cross-Strait boundary for the purposes of the use of 
force, he finds that “Taiwan is not a State because it still has not unequivocally 
asserted its separation form China and is not recognized as State distinct from 
China.”  Apart from its dysfunctionality in encouraging Taiwanese to believe 
that a more definitive expression of their desire for statehood is all that stands in 
the way of their goal, Crawford's analysis is not persuasive on the merits. 
Contrary to the prevailing objective theory of statehood that Crawford reaffirms, 
it is the tacit positions adopted by reacting states, whether in coordination or 
simply in the aggregate, that determine whether an entity possesses the rights, 
powers, obligations, and immunities of statehood.  By this gauge, Taiwan's legal 
status is indeterminate.  There is much concrete behavior of the community of 
states toward Taiwan that confutes the official rhetoric of non-recognition of 
Taiwan's independence.  The case for attributing to Taiwan the properties of 
Statehood improves the more that Taipei can establish external relationships 
beyond the permissible confines of mere de facto recognition and inconsistent 
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 The landslide victory of Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-
jeou in Taiwan’s March 2008 Presidential election1 has, at least for the 
short term, altered the political dynamics of the Taipei government’s 
relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Whereas the 
previous government under President Chen Shui-bian took an aggressive 
approach to establishing for Taiwan an international profile overtly 
incompatible with the PRC’s sovereignty claim, 2  prompting PRC 
 
1 President Ma, the former mayor of Taipei and the candidate of the KMT-led “Pan-
Blue” alliance, defeated Frank Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting, also known as Sie Jhang-Ting), 
candidate of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) and its pro-Independence “Pan-Green” 
alliance, by a score of 58.45% to 41.55%.  Election Study Center, National Chengchi 
University, Detailed Results of Candidates for the 4rd Direct Presidential Election, Mar. 
22, 2008, http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote3.asp?pass1=A2008A0000000000aaa (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
2 Perhaps the most outwardly provocative of these was to use the name “Taiwan” 
instead of “Republic of China” in Taipei’s predictably futile (i.e., fifteenth consecutive) 
2007 bid for separate United Nations membership.  See Mainland Affairs Council, 
Position Paper Regarding the Referendum on Joining the United )ations Under the 
)ame of Taiwan, Sept. 7, 2007, http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/un/02e.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2009).  Chen’s government sought to procure a mandate for this move in 
a referendum held at the time of the 2008 Presidential election, but fell well short of the 
voter participation necessary to validate the outcome.  See Alex Kireev, Taiwan:  U) 
Membership Referendum, Electoral Geography 2.0, http://www.electoralgeography.com/ 
new/en/countries/t/taiwan/taiwan-un-membership-referendum-2008.html (last visited 
May 10, 2009) (reporting on Taiwanese voters’ responses to the UN Membership 
Referendum, where even though 94.91% responded “yes” to the question of whether 
Taiwan should apply for UN membership under the name “Taiwan,” voter turnout was 
only 35.82%). 
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counter-moves and saber-rattling, the new Government’s “flexible 
diplomacy” aims to expand cooperation with the Mainland and to avoid 
confrontations over the question of official status.  The new government 
has abandoned its predecessor’s symbolic campaign for United Nations 
membership and the use of “checkbook diplomacy” to obtain and retain 
official foreign-state recognitions (currently numbering twenty-three) for 
the “Republic of China” (ROC), instead renewing Taipei’s focus on 
finding ways to participate functionally in international organizations 
without making such efforts into test-cases of the entity’s status.3  This 
turn away from confrontation appears to enjoy substantial popular 
support in Taiwan.4 
 The fundamental issue of sovereign authority, however, remains 
salient.  While conciliation may prove a more effective way to dissuade 
the PRC from obstructing Taiwan’s external relations and issuing threats 
of force, the new overtures tend to obfuscate rather than to obviate the 
question of underlying rights, a question that will arise anew if and when 
the spirit of amity dissipates.  And indeed, President Ma has felt the need 
to emphasize that his diplomatic approach does not signal a renunciation 
of “the sovereignty and dignity of the Republic of China on Taiwan”; to 
the contrary, Ma has affirmed that the “ROC is a sovereign country” and 
that the “future of Taiwan shall be decided commonly by the 23 million 
people on Taiwan.”5  International lawyers thus continue to confront the 
 
3 See Press Release, Ma Ying-jeou, President Ma’s Remarks at Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs:  The Concept and Strategy of the “Flexible Diplomacy” (Aug. 4, 2008), 
http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/print.php?id=1105499762 (last visited 
May 10, 2009) (emphasizing the importance of democracy, “willingness to maintain 
cross-strait stability,” and “fulfill[ing] obligations to the international community”).  
President Ma has summarized his position as one of “no unification, no independence, 
and no use of force.”  Ralph Cossa, Looking Behind Ma’s ‘Three )oes,’ TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2008, at 8, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/ 
2008/01/21/2003398185 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
4 A December 2008 poll showed that only 37.2% regarded the (greatly increased) 
pace of cross-strait exchanges as “too fast,” while 47.5% regarded the pace as “just 
right,” the highest percentage to so respond in the eight years the question has been asked.  
Press Release, Mainland Affairs Council, MAC Public Opinion Survey:  Cross-Strait 
Direct Transport Links are Conducive to the Enhancement of Taiwan’s Competitiveness, 
at app. I (Dec. 25, 2008), http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/news/08110a.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
5Id.  See also Ma Ying-jeou, )ew Year’s Day Celebratory Message, Jan. 1, 2009, 
available at http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/ma980101e.htm (last 
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puzzle of Taiwan’s legal status. 
 James Crawford’s magisterial 2006 second edition of The Creation 
of States in International Law updated his highly authoritative 1979 text 
in light of the intervening period’s vast accumulation of international 
practice in this area.  This volume was long awaited, and nowhere more 
so than in Taiwan, which has seen a major transformation in its external 
relations over the last quarter-century.  For those who may have hoped 
that Professor Crawford, perhaps the world’s foremost authority on the 
recognition of states, would boldly challenge the conventional wisdom in 
assessing Taiwan’s international legal status, the author’s 
characteristically judicious and nuanced assessment will come as a 
disappointment.6  Crawford finds that “Taiwan is not a State because it 
still has not unequivocally asserted its separation from China and is not 
recognized as a State distinct from China,” and yet he acknowledges that 
“the suppression by force of 23 million people cannot be consistent with 
the [United Nations] Charter,” and that therefore “[t]o that extent there 
must be a cross-Strait boundary for the purposes of the use of force.”7 
 Diplomats and jurists alike can be expected eagerly to invoke the 
new book’s analysis, since it lends Crawford’s prestige to a combination 
of positions that, while consistent with observable patterns of state 
practice, reflects political convenience more than it embodies doctrinal 
coherence. 8   To make the point in these terms is not to criticize 
 
visited May 10, 2009) (“[W]e should seize this opportunity to enhance Taiwan’s 
economic standing in the world, but as economic relations between Taiwan and the 
mainland become increasingly interdependent, we must also preserve the sovereignty and 
dignity of the Republic of China on Taiwan.”). 
6 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 198−221 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
7 Id. at 219, 221. 
8 This middle position between statehood and “renegade province” status might be 
seen as the most expedient for both the Taiwanese population and the international 
community.  A December 2008 poll indicates that while 48% of Taiwan’s inhabitants are 
opposed to unification with China at any time (favoring either declared independence or 
indefinite perpetuation of the status quo), and only 11% who favor immediate or eventual 
unification, 41%  prefer to maintain the status quo while leaving open the question of 
unification. These percentages have remained roughly stable over the course of the 
decade.  Mainland Affairs Council, Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the 
Republic of China (Dec. 2008), http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9712/ 
po9712e.htm (last visited May 10, 2009).  Taiwan inhabitants are equally divided 
between those who regard themselves as “Taiwanese” (46.1%) and as “both Taiwanese 
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Crawford’s analysis for being weak; it is to note that Crawford’s analysis 
is self-consciously weak.  In a self-effacing footnote to his requirement 
that Taiwan “unequivocally assert” independent statehood—a 
requirement for which he can cite no direct authority—Crawford 
explains that “[o]f course it is also true that the reason why Taiwan has 
not more clearly stated its position is concern, on its own part and that of 
its allies, at the likely consequences of doing so (i.e., a military attack 
from the mainland).” 9   The irony—indeed, the contradiction (i.e., 
identifying as a further legal requisite a course of conduct conceded to be 
precluded by credible threats of concededly illegal violence)—is hardly 
lost on Crawford, but the incoherent aspects of his analysis reflect an 
incoherence in the underlying source material.  The legal state of affairs 
on which Crawford reports is itself incoherent. 
 If Crawford’s analysis is to be faulted, it is in its failure to clarify the 
sources of the contradiction.  Crawford refuses to depart from the 
conventional wisdom that denies Taiwan statehood status, 
notwithstanding that Taiwan “appears to comply in all respects with the 
criteria for statehood based on effectiveness.”10  Yet, Crawford ascribes 
to Taiwan state-like properties—especially, immunity from forcible 
incorporation into the PRC—despite lacking any obvious basis in 
international legal doctrine for ascribing such legal properties to a non-
state entity.  Such an ad hoc attribution of legal entitlement, even if 
consistent with such instances of state practice and manifestations of 
opinio juris as can be adduced, has an arbitrary quality.  Advocates for 
the PRC can be forgiven for questioning how an entity that possesses 
neither the status of sovereign statehood nor a right to statehood under 
the doctrine of self-determination could be something other than an 
integral part of China, and thus how a forcible solution to cross-Strait 
relations could be something other than an internal affair.  To respond by 
 
and Chinese” (45.4%).  Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Changes in 
the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys (2008), 
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-2.htm (last visited May 10, 2009).  Polls 
nonetheless reflect decisive opposition (73.2% to 9.6% in 2002) to a Hong Kong-style 
one-country, two-systems approach.  Monique Chu, Public Growing More Confident in 
Taiwan:  Poll, TAIPEI TIMES, May 10, 2002, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/ 
News/taiwan/archives/2002/05/10/135425 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
9 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 219 n.78. 
10 Id. at 198. 
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characterizing Taiwan as an “entity sui generis” would be merely to 
admit, rather than to fill, the doctrinal gap. 
 What is missing is a coherent account of the indeterminacy that 
marks Taiwan’s status in the international legal order.  Such an account 
requires a reconceptualization of the relationship between statehood and 
recognition, as well as an appreciation of background norms that affect 
states’ legal consciousness. 
 The discussion below will first examine Taiwan’s characteristics in 
light of the criteria commonly articulated as the legal test for the 
objective existence of statehood.  It will then argue that this supposed test, 
assigning recognition a purely “declaratory” role, fails adequately to 
account for the ambiguities of the Taiwan case or for the international 
community’s broader pattern of practice.  It will instead contend that the 
true test of statehood lies in international actors’ tacit attribution, vel non, 
of rights, powers, obligations, and immunities that international law 
ascribes uniquely to states.  It will go on to invoke the principle of self-
determination of peoples, not as a direct determinant of the issue, but as a 
background norm affecting the legal sensibilities that bear on the 
problem.  Finally, it will offer a guarded judgment about Taiwan’s 
current legal status and a prudential assessment of the prospects for 
further efforts to bolster Taiwan’s position in the international system. 
 
II. TAIWAN AND THE OBJECTIVE ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD 
 
 The characteristics of statehood are routinely said to be those four 
listed in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States:  “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.”11  This enumeration reflects the Convention’s overall embrace of 
the principle of effectivity:  the question is one not of moral entitlement 
or political predilection (as to which competing values and interests 
promise to generate endless controversy), but of whether the entity 
constitutes an objective political unit, not subject to the law of another 
state, that must be reckoned with on the basis of international law.12 
 
11 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19, reprinted in 28 AM. J. INT’L L. SUP 52, 75 (1934). 
12  The Convention arose in the context of a hemispheric repudiation of prior 
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 As independent criteria for statehood, “permanent population” and 
“defined territory” are not particularly useful, since virtually all 
statehood claims, whether or not accepted in the international legal order, 
characteristically include sufficiently precise claims on behalf of a 
permanent population to a defined territory. 13   What matters in the 
Montevideo Convention context is that the “permanent population” and 
“defined territory” be united by some common and distinguishing pattern 
of effective governance.  The reference to “the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states” was apparently intended as little more than an 
exclusion of entities whose international relations are confessedly 
subordinate to another state—i.e., units of federal states (e.g., Michigan, 
Tasmania) and territories that have full internal self-governance but are 
dependent in external affairs (e.g., “associated statehood” arrangements, 
such as the relationship of the Cook Islands to New Zealand).14  Thus, if 
taken as the legal standard for international personality, the Montevideo 
criteria would confer sovereign rights, powers, obligations, and 
immunities on any territorially-coherent political community found 
under the long-term effective control of an independent government.15 
 
doctrines of recognition of governments that had, in practice, allowed the United States 
and its allies to choose whether to respect a disfavored government’s standing to assert 
the sovereign rights of a state.  See, e.g., Richard Millett, Central American Paralysis, 39 
FOREIGN POL’Y 99, 101 (1980) (quoting a 1927 State Department memorandum boasting 
that, “Until now Central America has always understood that governments which we 
recognize and support stay in power, while those we do not recognize and support fall.”). 
13 Precise delineation of the boundaries of citizenship and territory has not been 
deemed an essential prerequisite to recognition of statehood, as evidenced by 
international recognition of Estonia (notwithstanding the uncertain status of ethnic 
Russians living in Estonia) and Israel (notwithstanding uncertain borders). 
14  A state “has competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct 
international relations with other states, as well as the political, technical, and financial 
capabilities to do so.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. e (1987).  See also Christopher J. Carolan, The “Republic of 
Taiwan”:  A Legal-Historical Justification for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 455 (2000) (noting that Texas and Scotland are no longer 
considered independent states because their “foreign affairs are now carried out by their 
federal or central governments”). 
15  It is the underlying political community, not the government, which the 
international legal order identifies as a bearer of sovereignty.  That political community, 
in turn, makes and un-makes internal laws (including constitutions), whether by 
internally lawful processes or by violence.  It is always error to characterize a constitution 
as “constitutive” of statehood.  Rather, a constitution presupposes statehood, and inherent 
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 If statehood were an “objective” matter and recognition merely 
“declaratory,” the case for Taiwan’s statehood would be overwhelming.  
For over half a century, the Taipei government has independently 
maintained effective control over a “permanent population” within a 
“defined territory.”  It has never lacked the material “capacity to enter 
into relations with other states”—indeed, it held a U.N. seat for the first 
twenty-two years, and at this moment maintains formal diplomatic 
relations with over two dozen states, as well as informal quasi-diplomatic 
relations with scores of others—nor is its capacity to represent Taiwan 
(and the islands of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu) subordinated to any 
other government or encumbered by any claim (at least since 1993) that 
it also represents the whole of China.16 
 It is true that the international system is remarkably slow to 
 
in statehood is the authority to overthrow the constitution.  See, e.g., Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 
123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration] 
(“Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural 
systems, without interference in any form by another State.”). 
Crawford seems to say otherwise in respect of Cypriot independence in 1960.  See 
CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 89 (“[W]hile Cyprus under its 1960 Constitution was an 
independent State it was not sovereign, because the Constitution placed a wide range of 
acts beyond its power.”).  The limitations on Cypriot independence, however, are 
properly traced not to the Cypriot Constitution, but to the accompanying Treaty of 
Guarantee that purported to license external armed intervention to enforce adherence to 
the constitution’s terms.  The Cypriot government immediately thereafter contended, very 
plausibly, that this aspect of the treaty violated the United Nations Charter and was 
therefore legally ineffective.  See, e.g., Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of 
Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 246−47 
(1986) (explaining the Cypriot government argument that the treaty violated its right to 
self-determination and interfered in its internal affairs); R. St. J. MacDonald, 
International Law and the Conflict in Cyprus, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 17 (1981) (posing 
the question of whether the treaty was void since a state cannot contract out sovereignty 
and at the same time keep it). 
16 Between 1949 and the early 1990s, the Taipei regime entered into international 
relations, albeit with ever-declining success, as a belligerent contestant for standing to 
represent the state of (one) China.  It arguably follows that Taiwan, as a mere province of 
a “Republic of China” that legally encompassed the whole expanse of China, had no 
“capacity to enter into relations with other states” in its own right.  From the time that the 
Taipei regime renounced its claim to such standing and purported to represent Taiwan 
alone (as by pursuing separate U.N. representation in 1993), however, Taipei’s external 
relations can be attributed to Taiwan as such. 
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acknowledge secession.  Even though traditional doctrine holds that a 
new state should be recognized once the central government’s armed 
efforts to re-establish control have ceased or become manifestly 
hopeless,17 state practice is more reticent, and usually has acknowledged 
secession only after the central government’s formal relinquishment of 
the rebellious territory. 18   This case, however, is peculiarly 
straightforward, because the PRC never held any control at all over the 
territory in question, and such meager efforts as there were to assail the 
territory ended nearly a half-century ago. 
 Crawford points out that this state of affairs is owing to U.S. naval 
interference with the PRC’s efforts to assimilate Taiwan during the 1950s.  
Since he quite correctly dismisses the theory that the ROC has been 
administering Taiwan for over half a century as a delegate of the Allied 
Powers,19  Crawford sees fit to note (though does not rely upon) the 
 
17  See HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1947) 
(“When the struggle for independence has obtained a tangible measure of success 
accompanied by a reasonable prospect of permanency, international law authorizes third 
States to declare, by means of recognition of the nascent community, that the sovereignty 
of the parent State is extinct.”); see also id. at 93−94 (making the parallel point for 
recognition of governments). 
18 James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral 
Secession, 69 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 85 (1998).  An example is the international recognition 
of Eritrea, which occurred only after Ethiopia’s formal relinquishment, despite far earlier 
establishment of the facts on the ground.  Id. at 106−07.  According to Crawford: 
Since 1945 no State which has been created by unilateral secession has been 
admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the government 
of the predecessor State.  By contrast there are many examples of failed 
attempts at unilateral secession, including cases where the seceding entity 
maintained de facto independence for some time. 
Id. at 92; see also id. at 116 (summarizing “patterns of international responses to 
unilateral secession and threats of such secession in the non-colonial context”).  A 
seeming exception is the case of the breakaway republics of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).  However, as will be discussed below, this situation was 
conceptualized (correctly or not) as, not a series of secessions, but a non-consensual 
“dissolution” of an existing state into its component parts, such as to extinguish the legal 
personality of the SFRY itself. 
19  See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 207−11 (considering different views, which 
assumed that Taiwan was not a separate State, and concluding that “Taiwan is, if not a 
separate State, part of the State of China”); accord Brad R. Roth, Taiwan’s )ation-
Building and Beijing’s Anti-Secession Law:  An International Law Perspective, in 
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argument that this interference “constituted intervention in the civil war, 
and an attempt to disrupt the territorial integrity of China,” thereby 
implicating “the principle that an entity is not a State if created through a 
violation of the rules relating to the use of force.”20 
 The problem with this argument is that (as noted at greater length 
below) external interference of the same nature, albeit in the more 
indirect form of materiel and logistical support, has persisted openly and 
notoriously ever since.  While the PRC cannot be said to have acquiesced 
in this practice, virtually all other elements of the international 
community have manifestly become reconciled to it.  For all of their 
reluctance to regularize relations with Taiwan, states and 
intergovernmental organizations do not characterize Taiwan’s de facto 
distinctness as the product of an internationally unlawful situation, nor 
do they express disapproval of the defensive military assistance supplied 
to Taiwan by the U.S. and other states.  Indeed, by the time that Taiwan 
could no longer plausibly be regarded as Allied-occupied Japanese 
territory or as unallocated territory relinquished by Japan in the 1951 
Peace Treaty of San Francisco, the stability of the cross-Strait division 
was such that forcible action by the PRC to incorporate Taiwan would 
necessarily have been seen as a matter of serious international concern, 
discouragement of which was widely welcome, even if not granted any 
specific imprimatur. 21   It is therefore very difficult to characterize 
Taiwan’s continued distinctness as an inadmissible fruit of unlawful 
intervention, from which legal consequences are forever disallowed. 
 This leaves what Crawford characterizes as the “determinative” point:  
“there is even now widespread agreement that Taiwan is not a State but 
part of a larger China.”22  Neglecting the wide range of legally irrelevant 
notions that this affirmation of a “larger China” might reflect, 23  he 
 
SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTITUTION, AND THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN 1, 14−15 (Chen Chi-sen et al. 
eds., 2006) (discussing the pitfalls of the “Allied trusteeship” theory). 
20 See CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 211. 
21 Crawford implies as much in saying that “attempts to solve the problem of Taiwan 
otherwise than by peaceful means must now constitute a situation ‘likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security’ under Article 33 of the Charter.”  Id. at 
220. 
22 Id. at 211. 
23 Surely, there is no logical inconsistency in, nor lack of precedent for, the idea that 
two political entities, each possessing all of the legal attributes of statehood, might 
encompass distinct parts of a larger “nation,” where political unity remains a shared 
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contends that “Taiwan itself has by no means rejected” this view. 24  
Without citing any particular authority, Crawford maintains: 
Claims to statehood are not to be inferred from statements or actions 
short of explicit declaration; and in the apparent absence of any claim 
to secede the status of Taiwan can only be that of a part of the State of 
China under separate administration.25 
 Apart from its dysfunctionality in encouraging Taiwanese to believe 
that a more definitive expression of their desire for statehood is all that 
stands in the way of their goal, Crawford’s application of law to fact is 
not persuasive on the merits. 
 Without any doubt, the current Taiwan Question is complicated by its 
origins in an earlier controversy that falls within a different conceptual 
frame, that of recognition of governments.  From 1949 until the early 
1990s, the dispute between the Beijing and Taipei governments was over 
standing to represent an undivided China.  Until the early 1990s, the 
Taipei government’s claim to exercise sovereignty was, however 
unrealistically, predicated on its belligerent status as a contestant for 
control of one China.  Even after all serious efforts to restore control 
militarily over the Mainland were abandoned in the mid-1950s, those 
states that continued to recognize the “Republic of China” (as did the 
United Nations prior to 1971) nominally regarded it as the de jure 
government of the Mainland.26  So clearly untenable was this state of 
affairs that its persistence into the 1970s, even in purely nominal terms, 
seems surprising in retrospect. 
 Although a governmental apparatus purporting to represent the 
“Republic of China” has existed continuously since 1911, that apparatus 
is not, in itself, a bearer of sovereign rights.  A government can assert 
sovereign rights only if the entity for which it speaks has a legal 
existence as a state—on one or both sides of the Strait.  The Taipei 
Government thus can be recognized either as representing an undivided 
 
aspiration for the indefinite future.  Crawford acknowledges the 1999 statements of then-
President Lee Teng-hui to just this effect, id. at 216−17, but manages to sidestep their 
import. 
24 Id. at 211. 
25 Id. 
26 A state recognizing one belligerent faction as the legitimate government of the 
state can, in principle, accord the opposing faction only such limited accommodations 
consistent with “de facto recognition.”  See infra Part IV. 
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China or as representing Taiwan alone; there is no third option.  As a 
doctrinal matter, any assertion of sovereign rights by the “Republic of 
China” that disavows the exercise of those rights on behalf of the 
Mainland necessarily implies an assertion of Taiwan’s independence. 
 In the early 1990s, the Taipei Government began to campaign for the 
proposition that the two sides of the Strait constituted “two legal entities 
in the international arena,”27 “each . . . entitled to represent the residents 
of the territory under its de facto control” separately as a United Nations 
member.28  Only then did the question of an international status for the 
territory, separate from “one China,” formally arise.  Subsequent 
pronouncements from Taipei under Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen 
Shui-bian edged ever further toward an assertion of sovereignty in the 
name of an independent Taiwan.  Thus, according to a November 3, 2006 
pronouncement of Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), “The 
Republic of China is an independent sovereign country.  The status quo 
in the Taiwan Strait is that both sides across the Strait have no 
jurisdiction over each other.  There is no such issue of ‘independence’ or 
‘unification’ between them.” 29   Although in 2008, new President Ma 
Ying-jeou rhetorically reversed course, characterizing cross-state 
 
27 SHIRLEY A. KAN, CHINA/TAIWAN: EVOLUTION OF THE “ONE CHINA” POLICY—KEY 
STATEMENTS FROM WASHINGTON, BEIJING, AND TAIPEI 52 (Dec. 13, 2007) (citing Mainland 
Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, Explanation of Relations Across the 
Taiwan Strait, July 5, 1994), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf 
(emphasis omitted) (last visited May 10, 2009).  The 1994 statement is, to put the point 
charitably, a model of hair-splitting: 
[R]elations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not those between 
two separate countries, neither are they purely domestic in nature. . . . [E]ach 
[side] has jurisdiction over its respective territory and [the two sides] should 
coexist as two legal entities in the international arena.  As for their relationship 
with each other, it is that of two separate areas of one China and is therefore 
‘domestic’ or ‘Chinese’ in nature. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
28 Id. at 51 (quoting from a September 17, 1993 ROC statement on “The Case for 
Taipei’s U.N. Representation”) (emphasis omitted). 
29 Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, The Government’s Position Paper on 
Ma Ying-jeou’s Stance about “Taiwan’s Pledge of )ot Seeking Independence in Exchange 
for China’s Commitment of )ot Using Force against Taiwan,” Nov. 3, 2006, 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/951103e.htm (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
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relations as between “regions” and reaffirming the ROC’s constitutional 
position that it encompasses mainland China,30 he has asserted no less 
commitment to “the sovereignty and dignity of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan.”31  In the face of such pronouncements, Crawford’s claim that 
“Taiwan is not a State because it still has not unequivocally asserted its 
separation from China” rings fairly hollow. 
 In sum, if the statehood status is understood as a purely objective 
question, there is no persuasive doctrinal basis for denying that Taiwan is 
a state.  However, contrary to the dogma that Crawford seeks (at least, 
nominally) to uphold, statehood status is not a purely objective question, 
but rather depends directly on the response of the international 
community to the objective circumstances. 
 
III. THE ROLE OF RECOGNITION:  CONSTITUTIVE OR DECLARATORY? 
 
 If one puts aside the seemingly improvised contention that a 
statehood claim objectively requires the incantation of certain magic 
words, the perennial doctrinal controversy over the role of recognition in 
determining statehood remains.  As only some two dozen “mostly very 
small” states currently accord official recognition to the Taipei 
government, and as these do so only as inasmuch as that government 
represents “the Republic of China,” 32  Crawford takes refuge in the 
proposition that Taiwan is not generally recognized in the international 
community “as a State distinct from China33 Yet reliance on this 
point poses difficulties for the cohesiveness of Crawford’s book, which 
generally insists on assigning recognition a merely “declaratory” rather 
than a “constitutive” role:  “An entity is not a State because it is 
 
30 Ko Shu-Ling, Ma Refers to China as ROC Territory in Magazine Interview, TAIPEI 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/ 
2008/10/08/2003425320 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
31 Ying-jeou, supra note 5. 
32 Crawford concedes that “States establishing or maintaining diplomatic relations 
with the Republic of China since 1991 presumably did so on the basis that the Republic 
of China claims no control over the mainland.”  CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 219 n.79.  
He nonetheless continues to assign importance to the fact that “[t]he government in 
Taiwan continues to characterize itself as the ‘Republic of China’ and to stress its 
continuity, while increasingly practicing discontinuity.” Id. at 218. 
33 Id. at 219. 
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recognized; it is recognized because it is a State.” 34   Crawford 
nonetheless maintains that recognition can 
have important legal and political effects.  Recognition is an institution 
of State practice that can resolve uncertainties as to status and allow for 
new situations to be regularized.  That an entity is recognized as a State 
is evidence of its status; where recognition is general, it may be 
practically conclusive.  States, in the forum of the United Nations or 
elsewhere, may make declarations as to status or ‘recognize’ entities the 
status of which is doubtful:  depending on the degree of unanimity and 
other factors this may be evidence of a compelling kind.35 
 But evidence of what?  Crawford’s declaratory approach would seem 
to demand that statehood turn on some set of objective criteria, but since 
the presence or absence of such criteria can, by nature, be separately 
ascertained (and indeed, far more accurately so in the absence of the 
distortions introduced by diplomacy), it makes no sense to speak of 
recognition as providing “evidence”—let alone “practically conclusive” 
evidence—for an entity’s fulfillment of such criteria.  What recognition 
establishes is not some empirical truth about the entity, but rather the 
position that states and intergovernmental organizations take toward the 
entity.  What must be answered is the question of whether, and on what 
logic, recognition has independent legal significance in determining 
statehood status. 
 Part of the confusion that permeates the discourse about 
“declaratory” and “constitutive” theories of recognition derives from the 
tendency of the international law literature first to establish definitions of 
terms, such as “state” and “recognition,” and only then to inquire about 
the legal consequences attaching to those designations, rather than first to 
identify the practical legal question to which the designation supplies an 
answer.  Thus, the traditional literature tends to identify “recognition” 
exclusively with overt and purely discretionary state gestures—such as 
the opening of full diplomatic relations, the issuance of certificates of 
recognition addressed to internal courts, or the admission of the entity to 
an international organization for which statehood is a requirement—and 
then to ask whether these public acts are “declaratory” or “constitutive.”  
Understandably, the largest body of traditional literature rules out the 
 
34 Id. at 93. 
35 Id. at 27 (footnotes omitted). 
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most reductive version of the latter theory, which would allow any state 
to exempt itself from legal obligation to an entity merely by unilaterally 
repudiating that entity’s status.  The tendency is thus to assert the former 
theory.36  The seeming incoherence of Crawford’s position on Taiwan—
recognition is merely declaratory, and yet it is the lack of recognition that 
dooms Taiwan’s claim to statehood—is a product of the artificial 
constraint that the traditional pattern of the discourse places on his 
analysis. 
 If, however, one understands statehood as entailing a particular 
package of legal attributes—rights, powers, obligations, and 
immunities—that affect the obligations of other states, it follows 
necessarily that those other states bear the onus of adopting, whether 
overtly or tacitly, a legal position on whether a given entity bears such 
attributes.  There can be no question that the positions adopted by states, 
whether in coordination or simply in the aggregate, principally determine 
whether the entity’s putative rights, powers, obligations, and immunities 
are given effect, since it is typically those states, rather than international 
judicial bodies, that are in a position to accord or deny effect to these 
putative legal properties.  The remaining question is whether the position 
adopted by states, collectively or aggregatively, can be said to create the 
entity’s entitlements, or whether, by contrast, the entitlements are so fully 
objective that where the bulk of the international community is seen to 
misapply the fixed legal criteria, it would make sense to say that most of 
the world’s states are systematically in breach of their legal obligations 
toward the entity.  Either view is conceptually possible, but as a practical 
matter, the latter view is implausible. 
 To whatever extent the international legal system rises to the level of 
a coherent standard of global order, statehood is a normative and not an 
 
36  By rejecting “constitutive” declaration, Crawford responds to the question of 
“whether the denial of recognition to an entity otherwise qualifying as a State entitles the 
non-recognizing State to act as if [the entity] was not a State—to ignore its nationality, to 
intervene in its affairs, generally to deny the exercise of State rights under international 
law.”  Id. at 27.  Here, however, Crawford is speaking of a unilateral withholding of 
recognition, and of recognition as a discretionary and overt act of political will; he makes 
no general statement on the legal effect of widespread express or implied 
acknowledgment, vel non, of an entity’s legal status.  Indeed, his position on Taiwan 
seemingly cannot be sustained without according constitutive effect to such 
acknowledgment.  Id. at 219. 
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empirical fact.  A state does not simply cease to be a state when its 
government is ousted by a foreign invasion, nor is it reduced in size by 
such part of the territory as an invading army effectively controls; it is 
not erased from the map when its governing structure implodes and gives 
way to chaos, nor does it split into two or three states along the 
boundaries of even relatively stable insurgent zones of control.  Events 
such as these do not have direct effect on legal status in the international 
community.  Rather, it is the acquiescence or resistance of the 
international community—whether or not guided by normative 
considerations such as the integrity of the peace and security scheme—
that determines whether these events are permitted to affect a state’s legal 
status. 
 The constitutive nature of widespread express or implied 
affirmation37 of an entity’s legal status manifests itself in the countless 
instances in which the international community, often with a surprising 
degree of coordination, has selected the factual developments that it has 
been willing to accord or deny legal confirmation.  The international 
community has not only denied recognition to the results of unlawful 
acts such as interstate aggression38 and colonial settler secession,39 but 
has continued to recognize unitary states where control has been heavily 
contested.  Once a unit of the international system has been defined and 
accorded legal personality, that unitary personality endures 
notwithstanding internal divisions and crises.  Occasionally, the United 
 
37 To avoid confusion, one might prefer to call this “acknowledgment,” of which 
what has traditionally been termed “recognition” is generally a sufficient, but not a 
necessary, condition.  In a previous work, this author has attempted to characterize as 
“legal recognition” the overt or tacit acknowledgment of a putative state or government 
as a bearer of the legal attributes in question.  See BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL 
ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-32 (1999) (some of which discussion has been 
adapted for inclusion herein).  This effort at persuasive redefinition of the term 
“recognition” has, however, proved prone to serious misunderstanding. 
38 See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 15, at 123 (proclaiming that states 
may not recognize “a territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force”). 
39  See S.C. Res. 216 (Nov. 12, 1965) (condemning unilateral declaration of 
independence in Southern Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 217 (Nov. 20, 1965) (denying recognition 
to Southern Rhodesia and calling upon the United Kingdom to “quell this rebellion of the 
racist minority”); see also G.A. Res. 31/6 A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/6 A (Oct. 26, 1976) 
(denying recognition to Transkei, in part because it was established to perpetuate 
apartheid). 
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Nations has directly intervened to sustain or restore effective governance 
and territorial integrity in an unraveling state, such as in Congo-
Leopoldville in 1960 and Somalia in 1993.  More often, the international 
community has simply continued to recognize as unitary states countries 
where insurgents have held significant zones of control (e.g., Angola in 
1975-95, Cambodia in 1970-75), where secessionists have exercised 
control in most of the claimed territory (e.g., Biafra within Nigeria in 
1967-70 and Eritrea within Ethiopia from the late 1970s to early 1990s), 
and where the effectiveness of the central government has simply 
dissipated (e.g., Lebanon from 1975 to the early 1990s). 
 Such continued recognition is not exceptional, but in accordance 
with general principles of international law that regard “premature” 
changes in recognition status as unlawful intervention in “internal” 
affairs.40  That formulation itself presupposes that the boundaries of the 
“internal” are independent of the boundaries of effective control, until 
and unless the latter somehow “mature.”  Historically, assessments of 
such “maturation” have been transparently independent of any 
“objective” application of fixed criteria.41 
 A state is essentially a territorial political community that existing 
states collectively decide ought to be self-governing, whether based on 
existing, remembered, or foreseen patterns of governance within it.  
Where effective independent governance within the specified territory is 
presently lacking, agreement on this “ought” is most likely to be found 
 
40 See, e.g., LORI F. DAMROSCH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 
264 (4th ed. 2001) (quoting HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 152−53 (2d rev. ed. 1945) on 
premature recognition of secession). 
41 Some entities within stable boundaries, such as the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus and Georgia’s breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are denied 
recognition as fruits of unlawful foreign intervention.  Others, such as Eritrea in an earlier 
period or Somaliland (the northwestern region of Somalia today), remain unrecognized as 
a result of an evident reluctance to disturb the legal status quo.  See, e.g., Paul Reynolds, 
Somaliland’s ‘Path to Recognition,’ BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
hi/world/africa/7365002.stm (last visited May 10, 2009) (discussing Somaliland’s 
struggle to be recognized by other states).  Meanwhile, a substantial number of states 
have recognized Kosovo, notwithstanding that the Security Council’s preclusion of 
Serbian control over the territory was supposed to have been without prejudice to 
Serbia’s territorial integrity and political unity.  See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (“[r]eaffirming [a] commitment . . . to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the 
region”). 
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where that political community (within those boundaries) has been self-
governing in the recent past, both because the peace and security 
system’s status quo orientation naturally leads it to champion the 
immediate status quo ante and because no alternative principles are 
likely to find consensus.  Yet where agreement can be founded on 
another basis, such as the widely perceived illegitimacy of overseas 
colonialism and undesirability of fragmentation, the result is not different 
in kind.42 
 It must be added that the “ought” is as prudential as it is principled.  
The international community will hold out for restoration only of what is 
reasonably susceptible of being restored, and only when adherence to 
principle does not entail a cost that states collectively are unwilling to 
bear.  A constitutive approach to recognition is the only approach that 
reflects the international system’s indispensable pragmatism. 
 According to the most celebrated publicist of recognition practice, 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (writing in 1947), the view of recognition: 
approximating most closely to the practice of States and to a working 
juridical principle is:  (a) that recognition consists in the application of 
a rule of international law by way of ascertaining the existence of the 
requisite conditions of statehood; and (b) that the fulfillment of that 
function in the affirmative sense—and nothing else—brings into being 
the plenitude of the normal rights and duties which international law 
attaches to statehood.43 
Thus, members of the international community (either separately or in 
coordination) have a duty to recognize as states those entities that qualify 
for the status under applicable legal criteria, but it is only their 
implementation of this duty that brings statehood into being.  
Lauterpacht expressed the point as follows: 
[T]he full international personality of rising communities . . . cannot be 
automatic . . . [A]s its ascertainment requires the prior determination of 
 
42  On this basis, Congo-Leopoldville (1960) and Angola (1975) were originally 
recognized notwithstanding that no single independent government held or had ever held 
effective control of the full territorial unit.  See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 56−58, 
181.  Colonial sovereignty had been relinquished (in keeping with, if not necessarily as a 
result of, prevailing international norms) and fragmentation was undesirable (and, as far 
as Angola’s warring factions were concerned, undesired). 
43 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 73. 
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difficult circumstances of fact and law, there must be someone to 
perform that task.  In the absence of a preferable solution, such as the 
setting up of an impartial international organ to perform that function, 
the latter must be fulfilled by States already existing.  The valid 
objection is not against the fact of their discharging it, but against their 
carrying it out as a matter of arbitrary policy as distinguished from 
legal duty.44 
Crawford rejects this reasoning on the grounds that in international law, 
generally, neither individual nor collective determinations of states have 
definitive legal effect.45  But the notorious puzzle of the role of opinio 
juris in customary law formation is precisely that a legal duty is 
constituted, in part, by the widespread state perception of the existence of 
the duty.  The anomaly seems no worse in the application of norms than 
in their formation. 
 Once again, the recognition that performs the constitutive function is 
not the express declaration—whether it be the opening of full diplomatic 
relations, the issuance of certificates of recognition addressed to 
domestic courts, or the conferral of membership in an intergovernmental 
organization—but the tacit recognition that can be inferred from the 
nature of states’ interaction with the entity and from the states’ express or 
implied acknowledgment of legal duties that would follow only if the 
entity were understood to have the status. 46   Formal expressions of 
recognition may well be a sufficient, but are not a necessary, condition of 
a finding that the rights and obligations of statehood have been 
acknowledged.  Where states fail to articulate grounds for their actions, 
or where their declarations show evidence of expressing political 
considerations rather than legal judgments, identifying the legal 
acknowledgment entails nothing more or less than the task international 
lawyers commonly face in identifying opinio juris (as distinct from mere 
political pronouncement). 
 To conclude, then:  Strict adherence to the declaratory theory of 
recognition—that is to say, the objective theory of statehood that 
Crawford purports to embrace in the abstract—would lead unequivocally 
 
44 Id. at 55, quoted in CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 20. 
45 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 20. 
46 The behavior of the United States towards the legal capacities of the government 
of the Soviet Union prior to recognition in 1933 illustrates this phenomenon. 
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to the conferral on Taiwan of statehood status.  It turns out, however, that 
the declaratory theory is not a persuasive account of international 
practice, and Crawford seems to concede as much by his implicit 
recourse to constitutivism in his analysis of the Taiwan Question.  The 
determinative question, then, is whether states generally have expressly 
or impliedly adopted the position that Taiwan possesses the rights, 
powers, obligations, and immunities of which statehood is a necessary 
condition. 
 
IV. TACIT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS OF TAIWAN’S LEGAL STATUS 
 
 Beyond the small group of (twenty-three, mostly small) states that 
officially recognize Taipei, a great many states carry on interactions that 
fall well short of full diplomatic relations.  It is true that in formal terms, 
the ROC on Taiwan has been subjected to the “most drastic form of 
diplomatic isolation, namely non-recognition of its very statehood by 
most members of the international community.”47  On the other hand, 
Taipei maintains what have been referred to as “substantive” relations 
with scores of states on a semi-official or unofficial basis.  Official 
diplomatic relations have in many cases simply been replaced with, in 
the words of one commentator, “a veritable network of alternative 
missions or ersatz embassies, usually on a reciprocal basis.”48  States 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, France, and Greece maintain offices in Taipei, typically staffed 
by officials nominally “on leave” from their governments’ foreign 
ministries.49  These offices, and their ROC counterparts, are accorded 
 
47  DEON GELDENHUYS, ISOLATED STATES:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 126 (1990) 
(emphasis omitted).  Indeed, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has 
recently reiterated the point in remarkably unnuanced terms:  “Almost all countries—and 
all major ones—have recognized China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China.  So have 
seven American presidents of both parties—none more emphatically than George W. 
Bush.”  Henry A. Kissinger, China:  Containment Won’t Work, WASH. POST, June 13, 
2005, at A19.  The same passage nonetheless asserts, with little acknowledgment of the 
paradox, “[China] understand[s] that the United States requires the solution to be peaceful 
and is prepared to vindicate that principle.”  Id. 
48  GELDENHUYS, supra note 47, at 148 (noting that by 1987, 22 countries had 
established unofficial offices in Taipei, and that the ROC has established 76 offices in 40 
other countries). 
49 See Cheri L. Attix, Comment, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea:  Are 
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privileges and immunities characteristic of those accorded to official 
diplomatic missions.50 
 In principle, a renegade province could be the object of de facto 
recognition.  Insurgent forces, whether fighting in the name of secession 
or with the goal of ultimately replacing the central government, 
frequently gain control of substantial territory within a state.  Under such 
circumstances, foreign states find it, as Lauterpacht put it, “expedient to 
enter into contact with the insurgent authorities with a view to protecting 
national interests in the territory occupied by them, to regularizing 
political and commercial intercourse with them, and to interceding with 
them in order to ensure a measure of humane conduct of hostilities.”51  
Indeed, the need for such relations would seem to follow from the 
proposition that the loss of control over the territory relieves the central 
government from legal responsibility for acts carried on in insurgent-held 
territory by or at the direction of the insurgents.52 
 Nonetheless, in carrying on relations with a renegade province 
without the permission of the central government, on the basis of de 
facto recognition, foreign states are obligated to take care not to act in 
ways that contradict the central government’s claim of sovereignty over 
the territory in question.53  Where foreign states carry on relations with 
 
Taiwan’s Trading Partners Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 357, 364 (1995) (describing how various countries set up unofficial consulates 
general “staffed by government officials on leave from their usual agencies”). 
50 GELDENHUYS, supra note 47, at 148. 
51 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 270.  Indeed, even the conclusion of bilateral 
treaties, once taken to be a tacit recognition of statehood, has come to be regarded as 
consistent with mere de facto recognition.  See Linjun Wu, Limitations and Prospects of 
Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy, in THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER:  LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 35, 38 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
ed.,1996) (citing Article 8 of the Draft Code on the Law of Treaties). 
52 See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Recognition of Cuban Insurgency, 9 HARV. L. REV. 
406, 407 & n.3 (1895-96), cited in P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  BASIC PRINCIPLES 114 & n.23 (1994) (discussing the utility of 
recognizing “belligerency” in international law).  See also HEATHER A. WILSON, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 25 
(1988) (quoting THE LAW OF NATIONS:  CASES, DOCUMENTS AND NOTES 999 (Herbert W. 
Briggs ed., 2d ed. 1953), to say that the state should be responsible only for such “acts of 
insurgents which by due diligence it might have prevented.”). 
53  An early codification of this principle can be seen in the Inter-American 
Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, art. 1(3), Feb. 20, 
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the province that cannot be reconciled with the central government’s 
retention of sovereign authority, they are either (a) engaged in an 
unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of the unitary state or (b) 
tacitly manifesting the view that the central government’s claim of 
sovereign authority is no longer valid. 
 The Taiwan Relations Act,54 the legislative basis for U.S. interaction 
with Taipei since the 1979 official recognition of the PRC, is a model of 
authorization for dealings with Taiwan that are substantively 
irreconcilable with the PRC’s sovereignty claim.55  Section 2(b) of the 
Act specifies the following policies: 
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the 
expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful 
means; 
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other 
than peaceful means, including by boycotts and embargoes, a threat to 
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern 
to the United States; 
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and 
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to 
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or 
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.56 
 
1928, 134 L.N.T.S. 45 (declaring that states are bound “[t]o forbid the traffic in arms and 
war material, except when intended for the Government, while the belligerency of the 
rebels has not been recognized, in which latter case the rules of neutrality shall be 
applied”).  See also Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 15 (renouncing generally 
“any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States,”; moreover, “No State or group of 
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State,” and “No State shall organize, assist, 
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed 
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in 
another State”). 
54 Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 3301−3316 (2006)). 
55 Tellingly, section 4(b)(1) of the Act provides that “[w]henever the laws of the 
United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar 
entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.”  Id. 
56 Id.  The PRC Anti-Secession Law of 2005 thus directly provokes a crisis by using 
the words “non-peaceful means,” as if to deliberately challenge the Taiwan Relation Act’s 
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 The Act further promises to “make available to Taiwan such defense 
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to 
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”57  The 
U.S. government has consistently and massively implemented this 
promise, notwithstanding PRC protests, and it has not been alone in 
providing Taiwan with military assistance inconsistent with 
acknowledgment of PRC sovereignty over the island.58  The international 
community has evinced little support for PRC protests of the military 
assistance that foreign states have provided to Taiwan.  Indeed, Japan’s 
response to the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, affirming its 
commitment to Taiwan’s security,59 reflects a contrary opinio juris that 
has not been widely contradicted.60 
 Other aspects of foreign states’ relations with Taiwan seem to reflect 
a similar opinio juris.  For example, notwithstanding that the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation ascribes to every state “complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over that airspace above its territory,” 61  direct 
airline flights to Taipei run from such diverse countries as Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Russia, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Lebanon, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, 
on the basis of either government-to-government or indirect agreements, 
without PRC approval and at times over PRC objection.62  This activity 
 
implicit assessment of the international legal relationship between China and Taiwan.  
Text of China’s Anti-Secession Law, BBC NEWS, Mar. 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/asia-pacific/4347555.stm (last visited May 10, 2009). 
57 Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 54, at § 3(a). 
58  Although France and Germany officially curtailed their arms industries’ 
substantial dealings with Taiwan in the face of PRC protests, German shipyards 
continued to supply Taiwan’s navy with submarines through indirect channels.  Attix, 
supra note 49, at 383−85 & n. 228. 
59  See Anthony Faiola, Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan:  Growth of China Seen 
Behind Shift, WASH. POST FOREIGN SERV., Feb. 18, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33297-2005Feb17.html (last visited 
May 10, 2009). 
60 Similarly, international reactions to the 1996 Taiwan elections in the face of PRC 
saber-rattling gave at least the indirect impression “that the majority of non-participant 
states . . . on the balance viewed China as the wrongful agent provocateur.”  NIKOLAS 
STÜRCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (2007). 
61 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S. 259. 
62 Attix, supra note 49, at 382 & nn. 209−14. 
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would appear by implication to acknowledge complete and exclusive 
sovereignty for Taiwan over its own airspace, even though such 
sovereignty is an attribute of statehood and is incompatible with the 
PRC’s contradictory assertions.63 
 Still, most interactions of states and intergovernmental entities with 
Taiwan manage to avoid, by careful choreography, such clashes with 
PRC sovereignty claims.  Thus, Taiwan is party to the World Trade 
Organization as a “Separate Customs Territory,” to the Convention for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefish Tuna as a “Fishing Entity,” and so 
on.64  It retains membership alongside in the Asian Development Bank, 
an organization for which statehood remains a nominal membership 
requirement, but as “Taipei, China.”65  The theme of these interactions is 
studied ambiguity, and the result is that no definitive conclusion can 
responsibly be drawn about the collective opinio juris, beyond an 
affirmation that Taiwan is not subject to the sovereign prerogatives of the 
PRC. 
 
V. SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AS A RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
PRINCIPLE 
 
 The U.N. Charter embodies an international law of peace and 
security based on the principle of sovereign equality.  This equality under 
the Charter extends expressly to the “Members” of the Organization,66 
membership being “open to all . . . peace-loving states which accept the 
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”67  Yet 
the Preamble ascribes authorship of the Charter to “We the Peoples of the 
 
63 A similar inference might be drawn from the U.S. Government’s position that 
Taiwan is not bound by the PRC’s adherence to the Warsaw Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air.  See Mingtai 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. UPS, 177 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999) (“the conduct of 
foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the 
Federal Government; [and] that the propriety of the exercise of that power is not open to 
judicial review”) (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222−23 (1942)). 
64 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 203−04, 219−20. 
65 Id. at 203−04. 
66 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. 
67 Id. art. 4, para. 1. 
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United Nations”; far from a mere compact among ruling apparatuses, the 
Charter purports to codify the relationship among states qua political 
communities, “based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.”68 
 The process of decolonization occasioned a more concrete 
expression of the relationship between self-determination and 
sovereignty.  In 1960, without a dissenting vote, the U.N. General 
Assembly effectively elevated what had for some time been recognized 
as a “principle” of international law to the level of a “right”:  “All 
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.” 69   By adopting this position, the 
international community set about a sweeping de-legitimization of 
colonial and quasi-colonial arrangements, thereby marking a 
fundamental shift in sovereignty norms.  Yet although the consequences 
of that shift for Western European “salt water colonialism“ were concrete, 
with debate remaining only at the margins, the broader consequences 
were and remain unclear. 
 The statement of the rule itself is doubly indeterminate.  First, it 
contains a disguised tautology:  Since the definition of “peoples” is not 
fixed independently of the entitlement to self-determination, it remains 
open for argument that a group is certifiable as a “people” only once it is 
ascertained to possess the entitlement. 70   Whatever considerations of 
religion, race, ethnicity, culture, kinship, territorial separateness, or prior 
conquest may bear on the question, a “people” in the final analysis is a 
political community, recognition of which is conferred only in restricted 
 
68 Id. art. 1, para. 2. 
69 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) [hereinafter Granting of 
Independence].  The Security Council reaffirmed the statement in S.C. Res. 183, para. 4 
(Dec. 11, 1963).  The same language is repeated in other declarations and instruments, 
and constitutes Article 1(1) of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
70  See, e.g., Timothy William Waters, Contemplating Failure and Creating 
Alternatives in the Balkans:  Bosnia’s Peoples, Democracy, and the Shape of Self-
Determination, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 423, 432-35 (2004) (discussing schools of thought of 
the “self-determination” principle). 
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circumstances, lest the Pandora’s Box of secessionism be opened. 
 An accompanying resolution, framed rather innocuously as an 
interpretation of an obscure obligation under the Article 73(e) of the 
Charter to “transmit information” on “economic, social, and educational 
conditions” in “Non-Self-Governing Territories,” in effect specified the 
territories upon the populations of which the previous resolution had 
conferred an immediate right to “freely determine their political status” 
by opting for sovereign independence. 71   This category includes any 
“territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically 
and/or culturally from the country administering it” and which is subject 
to “administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical” factors that 
“arbitrarily place[ it] in a position or status of subordination.”72  The 
“territory and its peoples” realize self-determination in one of three ways:  
“(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association 
with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent 
State.”73  The first option is framed not only as an absolute right, but as 
the presumptive outcome, whereas the latter two choices are laden with 
requisites calculated to assure that they result from a genuine exercise of 
popular will.74 
 In purporting to interpret Article 73(e), Resolution 1541 noted that 
the Charter authors “had in mind” its application to “territories which 
were then known to be of the colonial type.”75   The resolution was 
clearly intended to have no broader application, but its articulation of 
principle may not be so easily cabined.  Although the colonial context is 
acknowledged as having called for special means of implementation, the 
self-determination right itself is widely interpreted to be of general 
application, albeit of contingent and controverted effect in non-colonial 
contexts.76 
 
71  See Granting of Independence, supra note 69, para. 5 (“Immediate steps shall be 
taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not 
yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, 
without any conditions or reservations . . . to enable them to enjoy complete 
independence and freedom.”). 
72 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), princ. IV, V, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15, 1960). 
73 Id., princ. II, VI. 
74 Id., princ. VII, VIII, IX. 
75 Id., princ. I. 
76 See James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its 
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 The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration “squares the circle” in an 
instructive way.  It follows its elaboration of the right to self-
determination with the following “safeguard clause”: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing 
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or 
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described 
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.77 
Subsequent iterations have broadened the last clause of the qualifier to 
speak of “a [g]overnment representing the whole people . . . without 
distinction of any kind.”78 
 This subtle and nuanced provision is best read in context of the year 
it was written, 1970, when only a minority of states espoused liberal-
democratic political principles.  In that context, the provision reflects the 
animating principles of a global legal order marked by pronounced 
ideological pluralism and extraordinary deference to states’ choices of 
“political, economic, social, and cultural systems” (including, on the 
basis of sovereign equality, one-party regimes that tolerate no organized 
opposition).  The above italicized qualification to the imperatives of 
territorial integrity and political unity seems to have been designed to 
function, not as an ongoing operative exception to the sovereign 
prerogative of existing states, but as a moral rationalization for singling 
out “colonial domination, foreign occupation and racist (i.e., apartheid) 
regimes” as special cases of derogation from the otherwise-fiercely-
 
Development and Future in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 7, 28 (Philip Alston ed., 2001) (noting that 
the Netherlands, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany objected when India, 
citing “the essence of national integrity,” attached to its ICCPR ratification a declaration 
interpreting the right of self-determination to “apply only to the peoples under foreign 
domination and [not] to sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or 
nation”). 
77 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 15 (emphasis added). 
78 See G.A. Res. 50/6, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995) (recognizing the 
50th  anniversary of the United Nations); United Nations World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1661, 
1665 (1993). 
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reaffirmed non-intervention norm. 
 In this reading, each existing state is the presumed manifestation of 
the self-determination of “the whole people belonging to the territory.”  
This presumption allows the Declaration to justify attributing to the state 
the people’s “inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social 
and cultural systems, without interference in any form,” a choice that the 
state’s effective government (even where objectively tyrannical) is 
further presumed to embody.79  Thus, the qualification, which appears to 
open a door, is best understood as an ingenious effort to keep that very 
door closed, while at the same time rendering a moral rationale for the 
disparate treatment of Western European colonialism and its vestiges. 
 Still, having articulated the principle, the fraternity of sovereign 
states cannot blunt its edge entirely.80  Where a government manifestly 
fails to “represent the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction,” such as by ethnic cleansing, the imperatives of “territorial 
integrity” and “political unity” lose their rationale.  Arguably, being 
subjected to gross and systematic discrimination reveals a minority group 
(whether marked by ethnic or other characteristics) to be a “people” with 
its own right to self-determination, though no minority (as distinct from 
“indigenous”) group in the non-colonial context has ever been 
authoritatively declared to be a “people.” 81   More likely, patterns of 
 
79 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 15. 
80  The combination of the affirmed applicability of the self-determination right 
outside the colonial context and the overwhelming international resistance to a right of 
secession has prompted some international jurists to speak of a “right to internal self-
determination.”  This language is, however, misleading insofar as it suggests an 
international legal mandate for any of the consociational devices that certain domestic 
systems have employed to empower sub-national groups—such as territorial autonomy, 
representational quotas in governmental and other institutions, and super-majority 
legislative voting rules for group-sensitive subject matter.  Except for “indigenous and 
tribal peoples” (additional victims of the Western European colonialism that represent the 
“original sin” for which the international system seeks to atone), sub-national groups, 
whether or not territorially coherent, have no established standing in international law.  
Individuals, however, may have special rights in consideration of their group membership.  
See ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 27 (stating that “[i]n those States in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”). 
81 Cf. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) (deciding that 
the self-determination right, though applicable in the non-colonial context, did not justify 
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extreme discrimination are now seen as justifying the international 
community—especially collectively, through Security Council action 
under Chapter VII of the Charter—in derogating from the system’s 
ordinary respect for territorial integrity and political unity, as in the case 
of the international trusteeship that supplanted Serbian rule over 
Kosovo.82 
 Although Taiwan plainly does not fit the favored model of the Non-
Self-Governing Territory stemming from Western European colonialism, 
it also does not fit the disfavored model of a rebellious territory seeking 
to disrupt an existing political unity.  To acknowledge Taiwan as a 
distinct political community with a right of self-determination is not to 
“dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of [a] sovereign and independent State[] . . . possessed of a 
government,” for it is Taiwan’s self-government that represents the status 
quo.83 
 Not only has the PRC never governed Taiwan, but Taiwan has been 
governed as part of “one China” for a mere four of the past one hundred 
fourteen years.84  Taiwan is “geographically separate” from China, not 
 
unilateral secession).  In arriving at this decision, the court managed to sidestep the 
elemental question of whether the “people” entitled to self-determination was comprised 
of (a) the entire Quebec population, (b) the Quebec territorial population, minus the First 
Nations, (c) Francophone Quebecois, or (d) all Francophone Canadians.  Id. para. 125.  It 
stressed merely that none of these groups was blocked from the meaningful exercise of 
self-determination, since Canada “possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction.”  Id. para. 136.  But see Crawford, 
supra note 76, at 59−60 (construing the court’s position as consistent with “both the view 
that self-determination applies to peoples in the ordinary sense of the term, and is not 
confined to the whole population of existing states, and the view that several peoples may 
co-exist in relation to a particular territory”). 
82 See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1244 (June 10, 1999) (paying lip service to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while 
setting up an international administration to hold those norms in abeyance, at least 
temporarily); see also S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998) (invoking 
Chapter VII powers in addressing the Kosovo situation prior to the NATO intervention).  
Even if the international community and the International Court of Justice uphold 
Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, acceptance of Kosovo’s statehood is 
unlikely to be overtly predicated on the right of Kosovar Albanians to self-determination.  
See G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008) (requesting an advisory opinion 
on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration). 
83 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 15. 
84 Ironically, during the lone four-year period of rule from the Mainland from 1945 
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merely in the superficial sense of being separated from it by the waters of 
the Strait, but in the more profound sense of the Strait having constituted 
a significant barrier to interaction with the Mainland for roughly a 
century.  Although Taiwan had developed as part of the Chinese Empire 
for over two hundred years (the bulk of its current population being 
traceable to settlement during that period), the patterns of its 
development changed substantially in the course of both its 
accommodation of and its resistance to Japanese colonialism.  It then 
continued to develop independently from the Communist Mainland, first 
under the state-capitalist-oriented Kuomintang (KMT) dictatorship and 
then in the process of reform and peaceful struggle leading to the 
establishment of a liberal-democratic polity and society. 
 “Reunification” would be an attempt to reinstate a nineteenth-
century phenomenon in the twenty-first century, under political, 
economic, social, and cultural conditions that bear no resemblance, on 
either side of the Strait, to those of the Qing Dynasty.  The political, 
economic, social, and cultural life of Taiwan is so manifestly distinct 
from that of the Mainland that any effort by the PRC to affect Taiwan’s 
status by “non-peaceful means” amounts, not to the maintenance of any 
existing political unity, but to an “alien subjugation” within the meaning 
of the Friendly Relations Declaration. 
 Moreover, strict neutrality between democratic and non-democratic 
forms of government, once deemed a corollary of the sovereign equality 
of states, has given way, whether or not to the “emerging right to 
democratic governance” cited by many scholars, at least to the intensive 
international promotion of “free and fair elections.”85  Elections and civil 
 
to 1949, the international community regarded Taiwan as part of Allied-occupied Japan, 
with its sovereign status yet to be determined.  See Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy 
and Taiwan, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 20−38 (2004) (reflecting on the views of “leading 
allies” with respect to post-surrender occupation and the Peace Treaty of San Francisco).  
Although Japan renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan in 1951, the territory’s status was 
never officially resolved, leading some to argue that post-war Taiwan never actually 
became part of “China.”  See id.  However, over the next four decades, both ROC and 
PRC governments claimed the territory part of China, and no voice in the international 
community challenged the assumption that Taiwan was within the sovereign entity that 
the two contestant regimes sought to represent. 
85 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 46 (1992) (demonstrating how the radical vision of democracy, while not yet 
fully law, is rapidly becoming a normative rule of the international system); Gregory H. 
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wars are no longer considered legally equivalent modes of exercising 
self-determination.86  Whereas traditional doctrine favored withholding 
judgment about political transformations within crisis-ridden states until 
after internal warfare sorted out the winners and the losers, the current 
trend is to prejudge outcomes in the hope of preempting violence.  Such 
was the case when the European Community’s arbitral commission on 
the former Yugoslavia, faced with referenda and/or legislative acts 
reflecting clear majority support for independence in Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia (four of Yugoslavia’s six republics), 
contrived—albeit perhaps quite improvidently—to reach a conclusion 
protective of the democratic will of the populations of well-established, 
albeit internal, territorial units.87 
 Taiwan is now widely acknowledged as a democracy; the PRC 
clearly is not.  While a coercive unification of the two sides of the Strait 
under a fully democratized PRC might plausibly find acceptance as a 
realization of the self-determination of a unitary Chinese people, a 
coercive incorporation of a democratic Taiwan into an authoritarian 
China would not be an equivalent development.  One would thus expect 
juridical creativity to be summoned forth to deny such a development a 
legal imprimatur.  This would be true a fortiori if mere words on the part 
 
Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539 
(1992) (discussing how domestic developments occurring in the broader context have 
affected traditional concepts of state sovereignty in international law).  See generally 
Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Democracy and International Law, 27 REV. INT’L 
STUDIES 327 (2001) (elaborating contrasting positions on whether and to what extent a 
“democratic entitlement” is emerging in international law); DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (presenting a 
range of views on questions relating to a right to democratic governance).  For a skeptical, 
but not dismissive, view, see ROTH, supra note 37. 
86  Note, for example, the continued recognition of elected Haitian and Sierra 
Leonean governments ousted in 1991 and 1997, respectively, and later restored by U.N.-
approved foreign military operations.  See id. at 366−87, 405−12. 
87  Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission:  Opinions on Questions 
Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488 (1992) (“Badinter 
Commission” opinions).  For further discussion and critique of the Badinter Commission 
opinions, see Roth, supra note 19, at 51-58; see generally Waters, supra note 70, at 438-
44 (contemplating the dissolution of Yugoslavia); PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF 
YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002) (analyzing the breakup of Yugoslavia from 
an international law perspective, in particular the development and application of the 
principles developed by the EC’s Arbitration Commission). 
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of Taiwan were met with actual armed force by the PRC. 
 Thus, even though states and intergovernmental organizations are 
unlikely to apply the self-determination doctrine overtly and directly to 
the question of Taiwan’s status, the underlying principle is part of the 
juridical consciousness that affects the perception of the relevant legal 
obligations.  This phenomenon does not guarantee Taiwan a right to 
statehood, but it does help to substantiate Crawford’s point that “the 
suppression by force of 23 million people cannot be consistent with the 
Charter.”88 
 
VI. TAIWAN AND STATEHOOD:  A PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION 
 
 Taiwan’s legal status is best understood to be indeterminate and fluid.  
Although an authoritative treatment of this topic would require a 
comprehensive review of the details of Taiwan’s external relations and of 
PRC and international reactions to each aspect, it suffices for present 
purposes to note that there is much concrete behavior of the community 
of states toward Taiwan that confutes the official rhetoric of non-
recognition of Taiwan’s independence. 89   The case for attributing to 
Taiwan the full range of rights, powers, obligations, and immunities 
attendant to statehood improves the more that Taipei can establish 
external relationships beyond the permissible confines of mere de facto 
recognition and inconsistent with the PRC assertions of sovereign 
prerogative over Taiwan’s external affairs. 
 For precisely this reason, however, each such effort will prove to be 
a political irritant, straining cross-Strait relations and embarrassing 
Taiwan’s most important ally, the United States.  Although the United 
States has behaved in a manner manifestly inconsistent with the PRC’s 
legal position, it has made every diplomatic effort to obfuscate this 
 
88 CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 221. 
89 That denial of an entity’s political status as a separate nation can co-exist with 
acknowledgment of its possessing legal prerogatives unique to statehood is illustrated in 
the 1972−1990 relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany to the German 
Democratic Republic.  See Markus G. Puder, The Grass Will )ot Be Trampled Because 
the Tigers )eed )ot Fight—)ew Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Détente Across the 
Taiwan Strait, 34 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 522−25 (2001) (suggesting that the 
PRC and Taiwan use treaty frameworks to increase exchanges and bridge their 
differences). 
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contradiction.  As President Clinton’s 1998 “Three Noes” statement (“we 
don’t support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-
one China”) made clear, the United States refuses to support Taiwan’s 
membership “in any organization for which statehood is a 
requirement,”90 so as to avoid bringing the question to a head.  Steps 
designed to improve the legal argument may thus have prohibitive 
political costs, given that the legal argument’s practical significance lies 
primarily in its contribution to the garnering of political support.91 
 It is also worth noting that recognition can be a Pyrrhic victory.  
Although the international order conferred recognition on Bosnia and 
affirmed the legal inviolability of its boundaries, the international 
community mostly stood by while those same boundaries were grossly 
violated, and forces heavily supplied from across the Serbian border 
subjected the Bosnian civilian population to sustained and grotesque 
violence.  Indeed, in imposing an arms embargo on the whole of the 
former Yugoslavia that failed to distinguish aggressor from victim, the 
Security Council inflicted a disparate disadvantage on the defenders of 
the supposedly sacrosanct Bosnian state, in derogation of that state’s 
“inherent” right under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to receive aid from 
its allies for its self-defense.92 
 Insofar as the legal opinions issued at the onset of the Yugoslav 
conflict by the European Community’s arbitral commission (the Badinter 
Commission), or any international diplomacy set in motion by those 
opinions, emboldened the Bosnian Government to make a unilateral 
declaration of independence over the opposition of a militant Bosnian 
Serb minority backed by the military power of the army of the dissolving 
Yugoslavia, it prompted a fatal miscalculation..93  A declaration of legal 
 
90 William J. Clinton, Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion on Shaping China for the 
21st Century in Shanghai, China (June 30, 1998), in 34 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1267, 1272 (1998). 
91 Note, for example, the statement by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien-loong 
that, “If Taiwan goes for independence, Singapore will not recognize it.  In fact, no Asian 
country will recognize it.  China will fight.  Win or lose, Taiwan will be devastated.”  
John Burton, Singapore Warns Taipei On Independence, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004, at 7. 
92 See, e.g., Paul C. Szasz, Peacekeeping in Operation:  A Conflict Study of Bosnia, 
28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 685, 697 (1995) (citing three arguments against the application of 
the embargo to Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
93 Id. at 693 (“to the extent that these opinions encouraged the Bosnian Government 
to seek early independence, that step provoked the disaster”). 
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strictures, however authoritative, is unlikely to forestall uses of force by 
those who perceive their vital interests to be at stake.  Absent resolve on 
the part of powerful actors to risk blood and treasure to uphold the 
entitlements of others, reliance on legal rights, however accurately 
ascertained, may merely engender a false sense of security. 
 At any rate, bold moves, such as constitutional reforms that overtly 
assert Taiwan independence, are not likely to affect the determinants of 
Taiwan’s legal status, and are still less likely to be beneficial to Taiwan’s 
position in practical terms.  Ma Ying-jeou’s Presidency may be seen as 
both resulting from, and embodying, this realization.  Taiwan’s hopes for 
full enjoyment of the rights, powers, obligations, and immunities of 
statehood, with or without the word “independence,” lie along the path of 
continued indirect and incremental progress.  It is by measured steps that 
the Taipei Government can build on an international legal consciousness 
of Taiwan’s non-subjection to PRC claims of sovereign prerogative, and 
of the Taiwanese population’s right to be free of the threat or use of force 
by a power that is palpably external. 
